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Abstract 
We use a long panel data set for four entry cohorts into an internal labor market to 
analyze the effect of age on the probability to participate in different training measures. 
We find that training participation probabilities are inverted u-shaped with age and that 
longer training measures are undertaken earlier in life and working career, respectively. 
These findings are consistent with predictions from a human capital model which 
incorporates amortization period and screening effects. Our results point to a market 
failure in the context of human capital investments to increase employability of older 
workers.        
 
JEL Classification: J14, J24, M53 
Keywords: Age; Human capital; Internal labor markets; Training 
 
 
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Older workers have on average  higher employment stability than younger workers but 
low reemployment probabilities and often long unemployment durations in most 
countries (e.g., Hutchens, 1988; Chan and Stevens, 2001; OECD, 2005; OECD, 2008; 
EU, 2009). This puts large burdens to unemployed older workers (e.g., loss in 
consumption standards, psychological burden due to loss of main activity and social 
networks) and to society because tax payers have to finance unemployment benefits or 
early retirement schemes. The growing concerns about the future of pension systems in 
the presence of demographic change have already moved policy away from the pull 
factors of early retirement (Gruber and Wiese, 1999). Most European countries face 
however still less than 50 percent labor market participation rates of workers aged 55 or 
above (Fourage and Schilis, 2009). Moreover, firms will face an increasing labor supply 
of older workers and consequently will have to employ a higher share of older workers 
due to the ongoing demographic change. The question what factors might lead to 
employment barriers for older workers is hence of central importance for today and 
tomorrow because the answers provide policy recommendations on how to mitigate 
them.  
One major economic explanation for an employment barrier is that older workers have a 
productivity that is lower than their wages. As productivity is largely determined by 
human capital investments, the relationship between training and aging is of central 
importance. If firms as well as workers invest less in human capital at later stages of 
workers' careers and firms cannot adjust individual wages (e.g., due to collective 
contracts or minimum wage legislations), it would become less profitable for firms to 
employ older workers. Productivity enhancing training might alter the incentives to 
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expand employment contracts in current firms and to integrate older unemployed 
workers in new firms (Gruber and Wiese, 1999). In times of rapid technological change 
training becomes increasingly important because computer based technologies demand 
a new range of abilities, which older workers need to acquire in order to avoid the 
depreciation of skills and competencies (Friedberg, 2003).  
In this paper, we analyze the impact of aging on the participation probability in training 
in an internal labor market to shed some light into the black box of training decisions in 
firms. For this purpose, we develop a model for the timing decision when to train a 
worker, which accounts for screening and amortization period effects. We further use a 
personnel data set which comprises information on more than 10,000 yearly 
observations of 400 male blue-collar workers of a German company for four entry 
cohorts. The length of the panel is more than 24 years. The data contain information 
about four different training measures: short training course, longer training course, 
longer vocational re-training, and longer academy of vocational training. To analyze the 
effect of age on training participation probability, we apply random effects Logit and 
multinomial Logit regressions. 
The main results of our econometric case study are that training participation is inverted 
u-shaped with age and that longer training is performed earlier in life. Our results 
therefore support the implication from human capital theory that the length of the 
amortization period strongly affects the decision to invest in human capital. From this 
might follow a market failure for training of older workers as firms as well as older 
workers themselves have fewer incentives to undertake human capital investments to 
maintain productivity. Policy could hence emphasize training subsidies which aim at the 
employability of older workers.  
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Our paper is also important in the context of internal labor market theories. First, our 
results for age can be interpreted from an internal career perspective because we use a 
very long balanced panel data set of entry cohorts in a large company. Second, we find 
that workers with an internal apprenticeship have in general higher training participation 
probabilities than outsiders. The kind of training courses largely differs between both 
types of workers. It seems that external candidates participate especially in longer 
training and re-training courses at early career stages in order to compensate the lack of 
job specific skills. Internal candidates are more likely to receive extensive academy 
training and to obtain training at later career stages than externals.  
The subsequent paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the basic 
human capital framework and previous research. In Section 3 we present a model for 
timing of training participation, from which we generate our main research hypothesis 
and estimation framework. Section 4 informs about the personnel data set and 
descriptive statistics. The regression analyses are presented in Section 5. The paper 
concludes with a short summary and discussion of the results. 
 
2.  Human Capital Theory and Previous Research 
Becker (1962) distinguishes in his seminal work between general and specific training 
within a setting of perfectly competitive labor markets. General training is assumed to 
be useful in all firms, whereas specific training enhances only the productivity of a 
worker in the training firm. The employer will hence only pay for general training if 
investments serve specific productivity enhancing purposes and if the firm is able to 
deduct some of the gains from training by paying the worker below his increased 
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marginal product. Hashimoto (1981) supplements these thoughts by including long-term 
contracting without the possibility of renegotiation. Specific training costs and benefits 
from human capital investments will be shared by firm and employee if there are 
transaction costs of evaluation and bargaining over the worker’s productivity.   
Since Becker (1962), a branch of non-competitive theoretical models of training has 
emerged (Leuven, 2005).1 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) state that imperfect capital 
markets do not allow workers to pay for general training without smoothing 
consumption and consequently moving away from their desired level of consumption. 
Firms might invest in general training if they are able to compress wages due to 
asymmetric information and transaction costs of job search. Wage compression allows 
firms to pay the worker below or at his marginal productivity before and during 
training. If workers marginal productivity gains are larger than wage increases after 
training, firms deduct returns to training. In contrast to Becker (1962), Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998) treat ability and training complementarily. Investments in high-skilled 
workers are thus most profitable for the employer as compressed wages are the largest 
for this group.  
Empirical literature roots training participation to employer specific, institutional, and 
employee specific factors. Lynch and Black (1999) use a cross-sectional survey of U.S. 
                                                 
1 This is mainly due to several empirical findings, disproving the results of competitive labor market 
predictions using panel surveys (Booth and Bryan, 2002), cross sectional samples (Loewenstein and 
Spetzler, 1998), matched employer-employee data (Loewenstein and Spetzler, 1999), and cross country 
comparisons (Pischke, 2001; Bassanini et. al., 2005). These studies find that training is often of general 
kind and employer-paid. Several authors explain these findings through limitations of the assumption of 
perfectly competitive markets (e.g., Eckaus, 1963; Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996; 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). 
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establishments to investigate the impact of workplace practices and characteristics on 
the extent of employer provided training. They find that formal training programs are 
positively correlated with establishment size. Moreover, the share of trained workers is 
the highest in firm with high-performance work systems, high investments, and much 
physical capital (Booth and Zoega, 2000; Franzis et. al. 2000; Maximiano and 
Oosterbeek, 2007; Rinne, 2009).   
Drawing from the predictions of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), a number of studies 
examines the existence of market imperfections and training. Dustmann and Schönberg 
(2009) test wage compressing effects of unions and the related union effect on training. 
Using German linked employer-employee data, they find that unionization increases 
training. A positive effect of unionization is also observed in British data (Green et. al., 
1999; Booth et. al., 2003). Empirical support for a negative training effect of minimum 
wages, as predicted by Hashimoto (1982), is miscellaneous. No significant effect of 
minimum wage variations and training probability is found for the U.S. by exploiting 
cross state variations of panel data for younger workers (Neumark and Washer, 2001), 
by using cross sectional industry data Grossberg and Sicilian (1999), or by focusing on 
a low wage sample (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001). Metcalf (2004) shows that the first 
ever national minimum wage in the U.K., which covered about 5 percent of British 
workers, has even boosted the probability and intensity of training.  
Studies, which focus on worker characteristics to explain variation in training 
participation, have found education to be one of the most important determinants. 
Franzis et. al. (2000) draw from a rich database of employer and employee surveys to 
analyze the educational effect on training in the U.S.. They find significantly positive 
effects of educational attainment on incidence and intensity of formal training. Similar 
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results are found in panel data of young U.S. workers (Veum, 1997) and in European 
data (Oosterbeek, 1998; Arulampalam et. al, 2004; Arulampalam and Booth, 1997). 
Workers' age and training participation has gained increasing research attention in 
recent years. Theoretical models with respect to age and training emphasize two main 
arguments: the amortization (payback) period of training investments and the signaling 
function of training. The former states that older workers are less likely to receive 
training due to lower net returns associated with shorter time horizons until retirement. 
Therefore, the investments into older workers have to yield significantly larger gains to 
make their training profitable (Becker, 1993), especially when facing deferred payment 
schemes (Lazear, 1979). The signaling function of training refers to information 
asymmetries. After hiring costs have occurred, firms still know little about the potential 
ability and productivity of the new employees. Training might reduce information 
asymmetries and is most effective early in workers' careers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 
1998). Overall, both arguments (amortization period and signaling) predict a negative 
correlation between training and age. 
Oosterbeek (1998) uses Dutch household panel data to estimate univariate and bivariate 
Probit models with linear age as explanatory variable. He finds small but significant 
negative age effects on training. Maximiano and Oosterbeek (2007) evaluate the impact 
of age on workers' willingness to receive training and employers' willingness to provide 
training. They report again a small but significant negative linear age effect. Studies 
with non-linear age specifications provide a more detailed view on the correlation 
between age and training incidence. Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999) include binary age 
categories as independent variables in Probit and linear probability models of training. 
The results are heterogeneous with respect to size, direction, and significance across 
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different countries. Whereas Canada and the Netherlands suggest an inverted u-shaped 
relation between age and training probability, Switzerland and the U.S. reveal no 
significant association. Cornell and Bryne (2009) extend the empirical investigations by 
controlling for binary age categories within a multinomial Probit regression. Training 
classification separates between no training, general training, and specific training. The 
empirical results suggest an inverted u-shaped relationship between age and training, 
which exhibits weak robustness when including further control variables. The inverted 
u-shaped age curve for participation in training is also found by Sousa-Poza and 
Henneberger (2003), who use age, squared and cubed age as explanatory variables for 
training probability. The results provide small robust age effects. Riphan and 
Trübswetter (2006) also find an inverted u-shaped association between age and training 
in German microcensus data.  
Whereas the downward sloping part of the inverted u-shaped relationship, which has 
been found in several studies, can be explained by amortization period and signaling 
effects, the upward sloping part can be explained neither by amortization period nor 
signaling effects. We therefore develop a new simple model for the timing decision of 
training participation in the next section. 
 
3. A Model for Timing of Training Participation 
The focus of our subsequent model about age and training participation is not on the 
question if a firm and a worker invest in human capital, which is the core of most 
models, but on the question when the investment is undertaken. For simplicity, we do 
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not distinguish between firm and worker decisions and treat training as a joint decision.2 
As we discuss the effects on total rents, the rent sharing aspect of human capital 
investments can be neglected and, hence, wages need not to be incorporated in our 
model. Moreover, human capital investments are a binary choice variable because our 
paper is about participation in training courses. 
The basic mechanisms in our model are a "screening/learning effect" and an 
"amortization period effect" which have different directions. Younger workers are more 
engaged in job shopping and firms have to undertake more screening of younger 
workers, because uncertainty of their quality and willingness to stay in a specific job 
and firm is higher. Consequently, firms as well as workers have lower incentives to 
invest in (specific) human capital at the start of an employment relationship when a 
worker is young. If the match between worker and firm proves to be of good quality, 
both parties have incentives to undertake human capital investments. The worker 
benefits from higher future wages due to higher future productivity and from signaling 
higher productivity and work attachment to increase his promotion probability. The firm 
benefits from higher future productivity of workers. The firm furthermore might need 
some time to learn about workers' skills to determine training contents and to select 
participants. We therefore expect that the training participation probability is positively 
correlated with age for younger workers ("screening/learning effect"). Investment 
incentives however decline with age because the amortization period decreases as a 
worker gets older and approaches retirement age ("amortization period effect"). While 
                                                 
2 Workers and firms face in principal the same effects discussed in the following. Thus, we would obtain 
the same insights if the investment decisions are analyzed separately. An advantage of analyzing the joint 
decision is however that we can neglect the rent sharing aspect of human capital investments.  
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the total effect of age on training should be dominated by the "screening/learning effect" 
in the first years of workers' careers, the "amortization period effect" should dominate 
after the first years of employment. 
Let us now turn to the simple model. The decision to train a worker depends on total net 
rents of training R in equation (1).3 The net rents are the total increase in the value of 
productivity ΔP due to training (compared to the situation in which a worker receives no 
training) over all years t until retirement is reached minus the total fixed costs C of the 
training course. The age at which training takes place is denoted with a and retirement 
age with r. The length of the amortization period in years is therefore r-a. 
 (1) 
1
[ ]
r a
t
t
R a P C P C 

     
We consider two cases. The first case assumes no depreciation of human capital 
acquired in the training course, which leads to a constant productivity increase over time 
(ΔPt=ΔP0), while the second case acknowledges human capital depreciation. At first, we 
illustrate the "amortization period effect" for the first case. The total net rent is depicted 
in equation (2) and its first derivate with respect to age in equation (3). We see that one 
more year of age at training, which implies a reduction of the amortization period by 
one year, decreases the total net rent linear by the foregone higher value of productivity 
in that additional year. 
 (2) 0 0
1
( )
r a
t
R P C P C r a P C  

        
                                                 
3 Table A.1 in the Appendix contains a list of the model's variables. 
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 (3) 0
  
R P
a
  
In the next step, we introduce the "screening/learning effect". The "screening/learning 
effect" implies that the productivity increase is to some extent uncertain, which is 
represented through the expected total productivity increase as presented in equation 
(4). Firms as well as workers need to learn about the match quality and the willingness 
to engage in a long-term contract to benefit from returns of human capital investments. 
The firm further needs to learn about a worker's human capital stock to determine 
course contents. Both learning necessities can be introduced through a learning 
parameter γ, which is a non-linear function of age at training. If training takes place later 
in life, the more has been learned about a worker, but with decreasing marginal returns 
to learning.4 Because the learning parameter γ is restricted to values between zero and 
one, γ can be interpreted as the probability that a worker has the increased productivity 
after training and (1-γ) as the probability that training does not increase productivity 
(ΔP=0).   
 (4)    0[ ] ( )E P a r a P     with   2 20, 0   a a
   
Equation (5) presents the expected total net rent combining the "amortization period 
effect" and the "screening/learning effect". The first derivate in equation (6) shows that 
the expected total net rent increases with age as long as 0 0( ) [ ]r a P a Pa
       and 
                                                 
4 Note that learning in our model depends only on age. This can be reasoned by the fact that workers in 
our model are homogeneous with respect to entry age and tenure is age minus entry age. A rationale in a 
model with heterogeneous entry age would be that learning can also take place through previous work 
careers in other firms (e.g., experience, signals). 
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decreases with age if 0 0( ) [ ]r a P a Pa
      . It can be seen that the left hand side of 
the first order condition for the maximum expected total net rent in equation (7) 
decreases with age and that the right hand side increases with age. This is also reflected 
in the second derivate in equation (8). Overall, the age effect is non-linear with an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between the expected total net rent of training and age at 
which training takes place. 
 (5)      0[ ] ( )E R E P C a r a P C        
 (6)   !0 0
0
0
( ) [ ] 0
E R
r a P a P
a a
   

      
 
 (7) 0 0( ) [ ]
a
a
r a P a P
a
   

   
 
 (8)  2 2 0 02 2
0 0
( ) 2 0
E R
r a P P
a a a
  
 
        
 
We now consider the second case with human capital depreciation, which leads 
qualitatively to same results as the first case. Human capital depreciation is introduced 
through the depreciation factor (1 ) 1t  , i.e., the productivity increase due to training 
is lower in later periods than in earlier periods after training participation 
( 0 (1 )
  ttP P   ). The new expected total net rents from training are presented in 
equation (9). From the first derivate in equation (10) and the second derivate in equation 
(11) can again be seen that the relationship between expected total net rents and age at 
training is also inverted u-shaped if we account for human capital depreciation. 
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 (9)   0
1
[ ]
(1 )
r a
t
t
PE R a C 


   
 (10)   !0 0 ( )
1
0 0
ln(1 )[ ] 0
(1 ) (1 )
r a
t r a
t
E R P Pa
a a
     



 
         
 (11)  2 22 0 0 02 2 ( ) ( )
1
0 0 0
ln(1 ) ln(1 )2 [ ] 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
r a
t r a r a
t
E R P P Pa
a a a
          

 

  
               
The probability to participate in training at a given age (Ta=1) is depicted in equation 
(12) and depends on expected total net rents at that age. To be more precise, training 
takes place (Ta=1) if the expected total net rents plus an idiosyncratic normal distributed 
error term ε with zero mean are larger than some threshold value z. Because we have 
shown that expected total net rents are inverted u-shaped with age, the training 
probability should also be inverted u-shaped with age.  
 (12)    Pr 1 [ ] Pr [ ]aT E R a E R a z            
From equation (12) we can derive our econometric model applying a second order 
Taylor approximation to the expected total net rents (  E R ). Equation (13) states the 
basic Logit model we have to estimate in the following, in which δ1 and δ2 denote the 
coefficients for age and squared age, λ the coefficients for a vector of control variables 
X, and Λ the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. 
 (13) 2 21 2 1 2Pr 1 , PraT a X a a X z a a X                            
To summarize, we can formulate our research hypothesis for the timing of training, 
which is tested using longitudinal personnel data and Logit models in the next sections.  
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Hypothesis 1: The training participation probability is inverted u-shaped 
with age (δ1>0 and δ2<0). 
Our model allows to generate an additional hypothesis. Longer and consequently more 
expensive training courses are likely to increase productivity (ΔP) to a larger extent than 
shorter training courses. Therefore, the "amortization period effect" (-ΔPt) is larger for 
longer training courses so that expected net rents are, ceteris paribus, maximized at 
earlier training age. 
Hypothesis 2: The training participation probability peaks at earlier age for 
longer training courses. 
 
4. Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
We use personnel data of a large German company from the energy sector located in 
West Germany. The company is subject to a collective contract and has a works council. 
Due to data protection reasons we are neither allowed to name the company nor give 
any further information. The data itself contains a subsample of 438 blue-collar workers 
in the company's mining business, who entered the firm in four subsequent cohorts from 
1976 until 1979. All of these workers stayed in the company over the entire observation 
period up to the year 2002. The sample represents a share of about 25 percent of all 
employees in the company's operation unit and 3.5 percent of the company's entire 
workforce. 
A disadvantage of our balanced panel design is that we have no information about 
workers who left the firm. The data set is nevertheless adequate to study the long-term 
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issues of an aging workforce and of career aspects in the context of human capital 
investments due to its large panel length. We include only German male blue-collar 
workers without missing values in the used variables. This restriction reduces our 
sample by only 5 percent. The final sample contains 10,544 yearly observations of 415 
different workers (1976: number of workers n=105, panel length in years T=27; 1977: 
n=96, T=26; 1978: n=77, T=25; 1979: n=137, T=24). 
The data set allows us to use two kind of training variables. The first variable is binary 
and takes the value one if a worker has participated in training in a given year. Thus, we 
can apply a random effects Logit model. The second variable indicates what kind of 
training a worker received so that multinomial Logit models are appropriate. If a worker 
did not participate in training in a given year the value is zero. For training participation 
we have information about four different training measures: (1) short training course 
('Schulung') (one or two days), (2) longer training course ('Schulung') (up to several 
weeks), (3) longer vocational re-training ('Umschulung') (up to several weeks), and (4) 
longer academy of vocational training ('Berufsakademie') (up to several weeks). 
Unfortunately, we do not have information about earnings of workers. We know 
however that workers are paid during the training measures and do not have to cover 
any direct costs. Table 1 presents summary statistics of our training measures. On 
average 6.3 percent of the workers in our sample participate in some kind of training in 
an average year, which results into 664 training cases in our observation period. About 
two thirds of all cases are short training courses, whereas the other training measures are 
nearly equally distributed. 
 - insert Table 1 about here 
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Our main interest lies in the impact of age on training participation. We specify age in 
two non-linear ways in the subsequent regression analyses. First, we use dummy 
variables for the age category. Second, we use age in years and its higher terms. Though 
most age variance stems from within as we observe workers for at least 24 years, 
between age variance also exists since the workers were born between 1952 and 1963. 
We further consider dummy variables for schooling and apprenticeship degrees to 
account for skill differences of workers when they enter the firm. The apprenticeship 
degree information is of special interest because we have three groups of workers. One 
group without any apprenticeship degrees (27 percent), one group with apprenticeship 
degrees earned in other firms (48 percent), and one group with apprenticeship degrees 
from the analyzed firm (25 percent). More information about the explanatory variables 
are given in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
First descriptive evidence for the impact of age on the overall training participation 
probability is depicted in Figure 1. The results are based on estimations using robust 
locally weighted regressions. This is a non parametric approach to smooth scatter plots 
based on multiple weighted linear regressions for every observation point (Cleveland, 
1979). It can be seen that our expected inverted u-shape relationship is indeed found in 
the data which stresses the importance of non-linear specification of age when 
estimating the determinants of training participation. 
 - insert Figure 1 about here 
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5. Regression Analyses 
At first, we estimate a random effects Logit model for the general participation 
probability in training. The Likelihood Ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
variance of the random effects is zero. As our dependent variable is binary and has a 
rather low expected probability, linear regressions would yield a high share of outside 
predictions. We estimate two specifications, which reveal in principal the same results. 
The first specification includes dummies for age categories and the second specification 
includes polynomials of age in years (until the quartic term). The results of the binary 
random effects Logit regressions are presented in Table 2. Though we also present the 
coefficients, our main interest is on marginal effects at the mean of all covariates as well 
as on predicted probabilities.  
 - insert Table 2 about here 
The first specification in Table 2 indicates that training participation is inverted u-
shaped with age and peaks at the middle age between 35 to 45 years. We further use the 
results of our second specification to plot predicted probabilities in Figure 2. The 
participation probability is to some degree inverted u-shaped with age. As we have 
considered higher age polynomials, we do not smooth the age effect as in the robust 
locally weighted regressions in Figure 1 in the previous section. That we do not find a 
smoother u-shaped pattern is also reasoned by training course heterogeneity in the used 
binary pooled training measure. Therefore, a multinomial Logit model for different 
training measures is likely to identify age effects more accurate. 
 - insert Figure 2 about here 
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Our Logit estimates in Table 2 further show that workers with higher schooling (at least 
'Realschule') and workers with an apprenticeship degree earned in the firm have 
significant higher training participation probabilities. Differences between low 
schooling and no school degree as well as between an outside apprenticeship and no 
apprenticeship degree are not significant. Higher schooling is likely to be associated 
with higher levels of general human capital, whereas an internal apprenticeship is 
associated with job specific human capital. Both kinds of human capital might have a 
self-productivity effect on further skill acquisition, which increases incentives to invest 
in training for the worker as well as the firm. The firm might also have better 
knowledge of qualifications and skills of inside apprentices and can therefore more 
precisely determine training contents and predict outcomes (e.g., training success, 
productivity effects, willingness to stay in firm).  
In the next step, we use a multinomial Logit model to estimate a reduced form for 
participation probabilities in different training measures ((0) no training, (1) short 
training course, (2) longer training course, (3) longer vocational re-training, (4) longer 
academy of vocational training), which includes age polynomials and only dummies for 
higher schooling (at least 'Realschule') and internal apprenticeship absolved within the 
firm. The reduced form is necessary because otherwise we would have the problem of 
perfect predictions in different outcome variables. As has been shown in the previous 
binary Logit estimates, the reduced form is reasonable because we have not found 
significant differences between workers without a school degree and workers with the 
lowest school degree ('Hauptschule') and between workers without apprenticeship 
degrees and workers with apprenticeship degrees earned in other firms.  
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The multinomial Logit model is often criticized because of its reliance on the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption and some authors argue for 
using the Probit rather than the Logit approach (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2000). Recent 
studies show however that the multinomial Logit model performs better in practice, 
even under serious violations of the IIA (Dow and Endersby, 2004; Kropko, 2008). We 
decided for the Logit approach and carried out a test in order to check whether the IIA is 
violated in our special case. In detail we carried out the test proposed by Hausman and 
McFadden (1984). The null hypothesis that the odds of our different outcome categories 
are independent of other alternatives could not be rejected for any category. Table 3 
informs about the multinomial Logit regression results.   
 - insert Table 3 about here 
To make interpretation of the results in the multinomial Logit model easier, we plotted 
the predicted probabilities at different age levels for each training measure in Figure 3 
(see also Table A.3 in the Appendix). Short training courses are the most frequently 
used measure, which have their peak probability at an age of 42 years. Longer training 
and re-training courses have quite similar profiles with peaks between 23 and 25 years. 
Longer training in the academy is most likely to occur in the late 20s. For each training 
measure we find an inverted u-shaped impact of age, which is more pronounced than in 
the previous binary Logit estimates for the pooled training probability. The results 
further indicate that longer and, hence, more costly training measures are more likely to 
be undertaken earlier in life, which supports our second hypothesis. Older workers seem 
only to receive short training to update their skills. 
 - insert Figure 3 about here 
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We can also see from the multinomial Logit results in Table 3 that workers with higher 
secondary schooling are more likely to receive longer training and to attend academy 
training. Workers with an internal apprenticeship are more likely to receive short and 
longer training as well as academy training but are less likely to get vocational re-
training. The latter result is quite plausible as outside workers might have wrong 
qualifications for the job and need re-training. Job- and firm-specific skills acquired 
during an internal apprenticeship might have a self-productivity effect on acquiring 
further specific skills, which might explain especially the enormous advantage of 
insiders in attending the academy for vocational training because in this training 
measure advanced skills are taught. 
The timing of training participation is further analyzed by estimating the previous 
multinomial Logit model with additional interaction terms between the age variables 
and the dummy variable for an internal apprenticeship, which show significant 
differences (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). For an easier interpretation we plotted the 
predicted probabilities in Figure 4 separately for workers with an internal apprenticeship 
and other workers (no or outside apprenticeship degree) for each training measure. On 
the one hand, workers with an external or no apprenticeship are more likely to receive 
short and longer training as well as longer re-training early in life. This finding is 
consistent with our previous argument that outside workers might have wrong 
qualifications for the job and need (re-)training at the beginning of an employment 
relationship. On the other hand, workers with an internal apprenticeship are more likely 
to receive training later in the career, except for re-training. Workers with an internal 
apprenticeship are additionally more likely to attend academy training throughout the 
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entire career. Overall, we find all profiles to some extent being inverted u-shaped and 
that older workers are likely to receive only short training.  
 - insert Figure 4 about here 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main results of our econometric case study are that (1) training participation is 
inverted u-shaped with age, (2) longer training courses are mainly performed earlier in 
the career, (3) old workers are quite unlikely to receive any training, and (4) workers 
without an internal apprenticeship are more likely to participate in longer training and 
re-training at the beginning of an employment relationship. Especially the low training 
probability of older workers, which is likely to be enforced by shorter amortization 
periods, might explain disadvantages of older workers in the labor market (e.g., low re-
employment probability). Because incentives to invest in human capital decline with 
age, workers as well as firms do not make appropriate investments in the employability 
of older workers. Thus, a market failure in this context is identified as private actors do 
not make the optimal investments from a welfare perspective. This market failure 
provides a rationale for policy interventions. Such an intervention could be subsidies for 
training targeted at older workers. Subsidies targeted at older workers can counter the 
effect of decreasing amortization periods and increase the training participation 
probability, which hopefully enhances productivity and employability of older workers. 
Because the amortization period decreases with age, the training subsidies should also 
increase with age to be effective. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Variable list for theoretical model 
Variable name Variable description 
T Binary training participation 
R Total net rents from training 
ΔP Total increase in productivity due to training 
ΔPt Increase in productivity due to training in period t after training 
C Costs of training 
a Age when training takes place 
r Retirement age 
t Period after training 
γ Learning parameter 
β Depreciation rate 
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Age categories 
Age category 15-19 (dummy) 0.0513 0.2206 0 1 
Age category 20-24 (dummy) 0.1582 0.3649 0 1 
Age category 25-29 (dummy) 0.1946 0.3959 0 1 
Age category 30-34 (dummy) 0.1968 0.3976 0 1 
Age category 35-39 (dummy) 0.1968 0.3976 0 1 
Age category 40-44 (dummy) 0.1545 0.3614 0 1 
Age category 45-54 (dummy) 0.0478 0.2134 0 1 
Age polynomials 
Age at end of year (years) 31.9303 7.8547 15.0000 54.0000 
Age squared / 100 10.8124 5.0687 2.2500 29.1600 
Age cubed / 1000 38.4732 25.9047 3.3750 157.4640 
Age quartic / 10000 142.5961 123.3105 5.0625 850.3056 
Schooling (reference: no degree) 
Low school degree ('Hauptschule') (dummy) 0.7209 0.4486 0 1 
Higher school degree (at least 'Realschule') (dummy) 0.0799 0.2711 0 1 
Apprenticeship (reference: no degree) 
Apprenticeship degree outside firm (dummy) 0.4803 0.4996 0 1 
Apprenticeship degree in firm (dummy) 0.2514 0.4339 0 1 
Notes: Number of observations is 10,544 from 415 workers in a balanced panel design. 
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Table A.3: Predicted probabilities of different training measures at each age level  
Age in years (1) Short training (2) Longer training (3) Longer re-training (4) Longer academy 
15 0.0064 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 
16 0.0091 0.0009 0.0006 0.0000 
17 0.0116 0.0017 0.0017 0.0000 
18 0.0149 0.0036 0.0031 0.0000 
19 0.0164 0.0056 0.0056 0.0000 
20 0.0170 0.0081 0.0087 0.0001 
21 0.0170 0.0109 0.0115 0.0005 
22 0.0166 0.0131 0.0136 0.0018 
23 0.0160 0.0149 0.0143 0.0049 
24 0.0155 0.0159 0.0140 0.0098 
25 0.0150 0.0163 0.0130 0.0154 
26 0.0149 0.0161 0.0117 0.0201 
27 0.0150 0.0153 0.0104 0.0223 
28 0.0156 0.0141 0.0092 0.0224 
29 0.0167 0.0126 0.0083 0.0204 
30 0.0183 0.0110 0.0075 0.0174 
31 0.0207 0.0094 0.0069 0.0143 
32 0.0239 0.0078 0.0065 0.0117 
33 0.0283 0.0064 0.0062 0.0095 
34 0.0340 0.0052 0.0060 0.0077 
35 0.0414 0.0041 0.0058 0.0064 
36 0.0505 0.0032 0.0056 0.0054 
37 0.0613 0.0024 0.0053 0.0047 
38 0.0734 0.0018 0.0047 0.0042 
39 0.0857 0.0014 0.0041 0.0038 
40 0.0966 0.0010 0.0032 0.0034 
41 0.1041 0.0007 0.0023 0.0032 
42 0.1054 0.0005 0.0014 0.0030 
43 0.0987 0.0004 0.0008 0.0025 
44 0.0822 0.0003 0.0004 0.0016 
45 0.0616 0.0002 0.0001 0.0010 
46 0.0399 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 
47 0.0220 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
48 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
49 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
50 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
51 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
52 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
53 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
54 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Total (mean) 0.0405 0.0073 0.0068 0.0083 
Notes: Predicted probabilities obtained from multinomial Logit model in Table 3. Maximum is marked in 
bold. 
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Table A.4: Determinants of participation in different training measures (internal apprenticeship) 
 (1) Short training (2) Longer training 
(3) Longer re-
training 
(4) Longer 
academy 
Age polynomials:                
Age in years 5.414 ** 115.651 ** 12.403  10.830  
 (1.951)  (50.303)  (7.710)  (29.328)  
Age squared / 100 -0.299 *** -6.855 ** -0.622  -0.440  
 (0.094)  (2.987)  (0.397)  (1.505)  
Age cubed / 1000 0.007 *** 0.179 ** 0.014  0.008  
 (0.002)  (0.078)  (0.009)  (0.034)  
Age quartic / 10000 0.000 *** -0.002 ** 0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Schooling (Ref.: No/low degree):         
Higher school degree (at least 'Realschule') (dummy) -0.005  0.641 * 0.098  1.421 ***
 (0.179)  (0.337)  (0.470)  (0.240)  
Apprenticeship (Ref.: No/external degree):         
Apprenticeship degree in firm (dummy) 0.227 ** 368.985  -4784.415 * -339.300  
 (0.113)  (428.765)  (2600.853)  (284.814)  
Interaction effects:         
Internal apprenticeship * age -39.833 ** -73.523  636.273 * 41.093  
 (14.713)  (62.282)  (344.097)  (37.715)  
Internal apprenticeship * age squared / 100 1.789 ** 5.002  -31.529 * -1.832  
 (0.661)  (3.447)  (16.975)  (1.862)  
Internal apprenticeship * age cubed / 1000 -0.037 ** -0.143 * 0.690 * 0.036  
 (0.014)  (0.086)  (0.370)  (0.041)  
Internal apprenticeship * age quartic / 10000 0.000 ** 0.001 * -0.006 * 0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000)  
Constant -76.259 ** -728.563 * -94.192 * -102.510  
 (25.167)   (314.861)   (54.978)   (211.940)   
Observations 9888 
LR Chi²(24) 631.860*** 
Pseudo R² 0.103 
Note: Multinomial Logit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Figures and Tables Included in Text 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of training variables 
Mean Std. dev. Training cases (total number) 
Training (all) (dummy) 0.0630 0.2429 664 
 
Training measures  
(reference (0) no training): 
(1) Short training 0.0405 0.1971 427 
(2) Longer training 0.0073 0.0851 77 
(3) Longer re-training 0.0068 0.0824 72 
(4) Longer academy 0.0083 0.0910 88 
Notes: Number of observations is 10,544 from 415 workers in a balanced panel design. 
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Figure 1: Age and participation probability in training from locally weighted regressions 
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Table 2: Determinants of training participation 
 (1 - Coeff.)  (2 - Coeff.)  (1 - Mfx)  (2 -Mfx)  
Age categories (Ref.:15-19):              
Age category 20-24 (dummy) 0.974 **   0.061 **   
 (0.343)    (0.028)    
Age category 25-29 (dummy) 1.149 ***   0.073 ***   
 (0.338)    (0.029)    
Age category 30-34 (dummy) 0.854 **   0.050 **   
 (0.342)    (0.025)    
Age category 35-39 (dummy) 1.699 ***   0.129 ***   
 (0.333)    (0.038)    
Age category 40-44 (dummy) 1.643 ***   0.129 ***   
 (0.337)    (0.041)    
Age category 45-54 (dummy) 0.759 *   0.047 *   
 (0.408)    (0.033)    
Age polynomials:         
Age in years   9.153 ***     
   (1.735)      
Age squared / 100   -44.873 ***     
   (8.33)      
Age cubed / 1000   9.563 ***     
   (1.737)      
Age quartic / 10000   -0.746 ***     
   (0.133)      
Mfx:Age polynomials       0.001 ** 
       (0.0005)  
Schooling (Ref.: No school degree):         
Low school degree ('Hauptschule') (dummy) 0.014  0.014  0.001  0.001  
 (0.153)  (0.152)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Higher school degree (at least 'Realschule') 
(dummy) 
0.488 ** 0.482 ** 0.027 ** 0.024 ** 
 (0.227)  (0.226)  (0.015)  (0.011)  
32 
 
Apprenticeship (Ref.: No apprenticeship)         
Apprenticeship degree in firm 0.438 ** 0.412 ** 0.022 ** 0.020 ** 
 (0.166)  (0.165)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Apprenticeship degree outside firm 0.105  0.077  0.005  0.004  
  (0.144)   (0.144)  (0.007)   (0.007)   
Observations 10544  10544        
Wald test 111.83***  99.2***      
LR test of rho=0 65.82***  65.67***        
Note: Random effects Logit (coefficients and marginal effects). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Figure 2: Age and predicted participation probability in training from random effects 
Logit 
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Table 3: Determinants of participation in different training measures 
 (1) Short training (2) Longer training 
(3) Longer re-
training 
(4) Longer 
academy 
Age polynomials:              
Age in years 5.414 ** 4.188  13.830 ** 30.389 ** 
 (1.951)  (6.479)  (6.901)  (12.897)  
Age squared / 100 -0.299 ** -0.170  -0.696 * -1.317 ** 
 (0.094)  (0.336)  (0.357)  (0.603)  
Age cubed / 1000 0.007  0.003  0.015 * 0.025 ** 
 (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012)  
Age quartic / 10000 0.000  0.000  0.000 * 0.000 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Schooling (Ref.: No/low degree):         
Higher school degree (at least 'Realschule') (dummy) -0.005  0.662 ** 0.108  1.428 ***
 (0.179)  (0.335)  (0.469)  (0.239)  
Apprenticeship (Ref.: No/external degree):         
Apprenticeship degree in firm (dummy) 0.227 * 0.430 * -0.918 ** 1.644 ***
 (0.113)  (0.243)  (0.360)  (0.234)  
Constant -39.833 ** -41.354  -104.887 ** -263.261 ***
  (14.713)   (45.986)   (49.088)   (102.144)   
Observations 10544 
LR Chi²(24) 517.200*** 
Pseudo R² 0.082 
Note: Multinomial Logit (coefficients). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Figure 3: Age and participation probabilities of different training measures from 
multinomial Logit 
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Figure 4: Age and participation probabilities of different training measures from 
multinomial Logit (internal apprenticeship) 
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